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Krmek: EU Tax Probe

EU TAX PROBE, STATE AID & THE CASE OF AMAZON

Tomislav Krmek*

Summary: Multinational entities are shifting their profits
from jurisdictions with high tax rates to low tax
jurisdictions that result in sovereign governments losing
millions of dollars and euros. Profits are moved away from
the jurisdictions in which the economic activity occurs and
sovereign governments face difficulties in exercising their
right to taxation. The most common method employed for
artificially (but legally) shifting profits is the transfer of
intangibles (intellectual property). This article will discuss
this legal tax avoidance in the European Union by
multinational entities using that common technique:
shifting of goods and services between affiliates (transfer
pricing). Companies are getting more self-confident in
doing this because of the advanced tax rulings issued by
national tax authorities, especially of particular member
states of the European Union, that provide legal certainty
for their corporate structures. This article will introduce to
the U.S. readers (potentially) “harmful” tax practice
exercised in the European Union by one of the world’s
largest multinational companies. It will examine the rules
of the European Union on state aid (Art. 107 and 108 of
TFEU) and the European Commission’s investigation and
their effect on such practice that is allegedly breaching the
internal market of the EU. The discussion will then move
*

LL.M. in Taxation, Georgetown University Law Center, 2015; Magister Juris,
University of Zagreb, 2012.
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on to comparison of “harmful” tax practices in the United
States. Measures that international community, especially
OECD, is implementing to fight tax avoidance will also be
considered followed by June 2015 European Commission’s
Action Plan on Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in
the EU and its January 2016 proposal for Anti-TaxAvoidance Directive. This article provides U.S. readers a
basic overview of the EU rules; it is not aimed at European
practitioners.

I. INTRODUCTION
The businesses of big multinational entities, especially those from
the United States, have been attracted to particular member states of the
European Union (the “European Union” or the “EU”) because of their
favorable legal and tax systems. The main goal of such multinationals is to
concentrate their businesses in such an environment that potentiates
maximization of profit while keeping their costs as low as possible.
Historically, one would imagine such an attractive place as an
offshore tax haven jurisdiction, typically an island. Its characteristics
commonly include low or non-existent tax rates on certain types of
income, no requirement of substantial business activity, lack of
transparency and information sharing, and ease of entry in terms of
incorporation of companies. It is also typical for tax havens that there are
41
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bank secrecy rules in place and there are little or no enforcement rules
applicable on the side of the tax authorities, which do not (or hardly) have
access to tax havens.1
It seems that places like Cayman Islands, Isle of Man, Jersey, and
the British Virgin Islands have lost their attractiveness to countries (such
as Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Ireland) where the rule of law and
the predictability of the legal system is considered to be the highest
constitutional principle. Additionally, many consulting firms employ
hundreds of highly educated tax lawyers and accountants who specialize
in providing expensive and valuable tax advice and the most cost-effective
solutions for multi-jurisdictional business operations to achieve low to
zero tax rate on certain types of income. A very important characteristic of
such jurisdictions is a possibility of advanced tax rulings, which can be
described as comfort letters by tax authorities giving specific company
clarity on how its corporate tax will be calculated or on the use of special
tax provisions.2 Governments lose income tax revenue caused by the

1

See generally Jane G. Gravelle, Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV (2015).
2
Press Release, European Commission, State Aid: Commission Investigates Transfer
Pricing Arrangements on Corporate Taxation of Apple (Ireland) Starbucks (Netherlands)
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shifting of profits into low tax countries. It is hard to estimate exact budget
losses, but some have identified annual losses of around $100 billion per
year caused by such shifting.3 It is also worth noting that the term tax
avoidance is considered to mean a legal reduction in taxes, as opposed to
illegal tax evasion.4 This paper deals with legal tax avoidance by
multinational entities in the European Union using one of the most
common techniques for that purpose: shifting of goods and services
between affiliates (transfer pricing).
The big wave of investigations in the area of “harmful” tax
practices within the European Union has started with the revelations of
more than 28,000 pages of leaked documents by the International
Consortium of Investigative Journalists.5 The journalists have identified
more than three hundred multinational companies that shifted their profits
to countries such as Luxembourg in order to save on due taxes. Alleged
savings have been enormous, and resulted in lowering effective tax rates
to little as 1%.
and Fiat Finance and Trade (Luxembourg) (June 14, 2014) .
3
Gravelle, supra note 1.
4
Id.
5
Stephanie Bodoni, LuxLeaks a ‘Game Changer’ for EU In Tax-Deal Probes, Gramegna
Says, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Dec. 22, 2014.
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The recommendations within the EU on how to combat harmful
tax practices go back to early 1990s. The Ruding Report of 1992 was one
of the first documents to present that the differences between member
states` corporate tax regimes cause significant distortions in the internal
market as they influence choices of companies‘location and investments,
and suggested that these practices be eliminated through harmonization of
tax bases and approximating tax rates between member states.6
The efforts of the EU in this field continued by the adoption of the
Code of Conduct for Business Taxation (which concerns non-introduction
of new and re-examination of existing tax measures described as harmful)
and the Commission notice on the application of the state aid rules to
measures relating to direct business taxation, both in 1998.7 The
Communication on promoting good governance in tax matters from 2009
is a continuation of the European Commission`s work in this field.
Following media reports alleging that some multinational
companies in the European Union have received significant tax reductions
by way of tax rulings issued by national tax authorities, the European
6

MARIE-ANN KRONTHALER &YINON TZUBERY, THE STATE AID PROVISIONS OF THE
TFEU IN TAX MATTERS 97 (Michael Lang et al. eds., 3rd ed. 2013).
7
Id.
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Commission has decided to open formal investigations under the EU state
aid rules.8 In a June 11, 2014 press release, three in-depth investigations
have been opened to examine whether decisions by tax authorities in
Ireland, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, with regard to the corporate
income tax to be paid by Apple, Starbucks, and Fiat Finance and Trade,
respectively, comply with the EU rules on state aid.9 The Starbucks and
Fiat investigations, with respect to their tax positions in the Netherlands
and Luxembourg, respectively, have been finalized by the European
Commission with an unfavorable result for both companies. The
Commission has ordered the Netherlands and Luxembourg to collect
approximately $30,000,000 in taxes from Starbucks and Fiat. This paper
deals with an additional investigation that has been opened with regard to
a tax ruling issued to Amazon in Luxembourg as communicated by the
European Commission in its letter of September 7, 2014. The European
Commission claims that tax rulings may constitute an illegal state aid
according to the Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (“TFEU”), which will be dealt with in detail in this paper.

8
9

European Commission, supra note 2.
Id.

45
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The paper argues that tax rulings issued to multinational entities providing
them with tax certainty and predictability that are commonly called (by the
press) “harmful” tax practices are not the negative phenomenon that is so
often presented. First, the aim of this paper is to analyze (potentially)
“harmful” tax practices exercised by multinational entities in the European
Union that use tax rulings issued by national tax authorities of the member
states of the European Union and their importance for multinational
entities` businesses from the international tax point of view. Second, the
paper will examine the EU rules on state aid and their effect on practice of
tax rulings and alleged breach of the internal EU market, with a brief
presentation of the Amazon case in the EU and comparison of the
investigation and procedure in the United States. Third, the paper will
address what measures the international community is implementing to
fight tax avoidance, primarily the European Union, the United States and
OECD/G20.

II. SOURCES OF EU LAW ON STATE AID
For more than fifteen years, the European Commission has been
using the rules on prohibition of state aid as a method to tackle harmful tax
46
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competition.10 Primary sources of EU law on state aid are contained in
Article 107 and 108 of TFEU. The goal of the state aid rules is to ensure
that member states do not provide selective advantages to certain
undertakings to the detriment of others.11
Article 107(1) of TFEU also applies in the field of taxation
notwithstanding the fact that the competence of the Union to regulate
direct taxation is limited under the TFEU.12
Art. 107(1) of TFEU prescribes:
Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted
by a Member State or through State resources in any form
whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the
production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade
between Member States, be incompatible with the internal
market.13

This provision prohibits the provision of advantages, in any form,
by national public authorities to undertakings on a selective basis.14 The

10

Kronthaler & Tzubery, supra note 6.
Id. at 101.
12
State Aid SA.38944 (2014/C) – Luxembourg Alleged Aid to Amazon by Way of a Tax
Ruling (herein “Luxembourg Alleged Aid to Amazon”), at 13, COM (2014) 7156 final
(Oct. 7, 2014).
13
EUR-LEX, Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union, art. 107(1), 2012 O.J. (326).
14
Kronthaler & Tzubery, supra note 6, at 94.
11
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following requirements15 have to be satisfied in order to have an illegal
and prohibited state aid:
a) Recipients are granted an advantage in a sense that the
measure relieves them from a liability that they would
otherwise incur from their budgets;
b) The advantage is granted by the state or through state
resources;
c) Such measure affects (distorts) competition and trade
between member states; and
d) The measure is selective in a sense that it favors certain
undertakings or the production of certain goods.
Exceptions to Article 107(1) are contained in Art. 107(2) and (3) of
TFEU.
Article 107(2) of TFEU prescribes:
The following shall be compatible with the internal market:
a) aid having a social character, granted to individual
consumers, provided that such aid is granted
without discrimination related to the origin of the
products concerned;
b) aid to make good the damage caused by natural
disasters or exceptional occurrences;
c) aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the
Federal Republic of Germany affected by the
division of Germany, in so far as such aid is
required in order to compensate for the economic
disadvantages caused by that division. Five years
after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the

15

Id.
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Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission,
may adopt a decision repealing this point.16
Article 107(2) of TFEU prescribes exceptions, which are ex lege in
compliance with the internal market.
Article 107(3) of TFEU prescribes:
The following may be considered to be compatible with the
internal market:
a) aid to promote the economic development of areas
where the standard of living is abnormally low or
where there is serious underemployment, and of the
regions referred to in Article 349, in view of their
structural, economic and social situation;
b) aid to promote the execution of an important project
of common European interest or to remedy a serious
disturbance in the economy of a Member State;
c) aid to facilitate the development of certain
economic activities or of certain economic areas,
where such aid does not adversely affect trading
conditions to an extent contrary to the common
interest;
d) aid to promote culture and heritage conservation
where such aid does not affect trading conditions
and competition in the Union to an extent that is
contrary to the common interest;
e) such other categories of aid as may be specified by
decision of the Council on a proposal from the
Commission.
Opposed to the ex lege exceptions of Article 107(2) of TFEU,
exceptions contained under Article 107(3) of TFEU are not ex lege
16

EUR-LEX, supra note 13.
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considered to be compliant with internal market. They will only be
compatible with the internal market after the European Commission, upon
notification by the member state, gives its authorization. The European
Commission acts under a system of prior authorization to ensure that
member states do not implement their measures of state aid before the
Commission grants an approval. In this way, it ensures that member states
implement only such measures that help firms produce goods and services
that would otherwise not be provided in the internal market instead of
measures that distort competition.17 Article 107(1) of TFEU will further be
briefly explained.
1.

What is aid and in What Forms can it Arise?

Article 107(1) of TFEU defines state aid as “any aid … in any
form whatsoever.”18 This means that aid represents an advantage or
benefit granted to the recipient of the aid favoring or improving its
financial situation, being it a positive aid, example of positive benefit is a
direct payment by a member state to the recipient, or negative aid,
example of negative benefit is an omission of the member state to collect a

17
18

Kronthaler & Tzubery, supra note 6, at 96.
EUR-LEX, supra note 13.
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tax at “ordinary” statutory rate.19 The European Commission report on
state aid rules states that “granting a tax concession entails a loss of
resources for that state in that it forgoes revenue.”20 The European Court
of Justice has described an aid as embracing “not only positive benefits,
but also measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are
normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which, without
therefore being subsidies in the strict meaning of the word, are similar in
character and have the same effect.”21 Notice on business taxation issued
in 1998 notes that an advantage may be provided through a reduction in
the firm’s tax burden in various ways, including:




A reduction in the tax base (such as special deductions,
special or accelerated depreciation arrangements or the
entering of reserves on the balance sheet);
A total or partial reduction in the amount of tax (such as
exemption or a tax credit);
deferment, cancellation or even special rescheduling of tax
debt.22

19

Kronthaler & Tzubery, supra note 6, at 103.
Commission Report on the implementation of the Commission notice on the application
of the state aid rules to measures relating to direct business taxation (herein “2004
Commission Report”), at 6, COM (2004) 434 final (Feb. 9, 2004).
21
Case C-143/99, Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke,
2001 E.C.R. I-8365.
22
Commission Notice on the Application of the State Aid Rules to Measures Relating to
Direct Business Taxation (herein “1998 Commission Report”), at 3 COM (1998) 384
final (Oct. 12, 1998).
20
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So, when can it be concluded that a certain tax arrangement
constitutes state aid? To determine whether a tax scheme derogating from
the normal system may constitute state aid, it must be established whether
the resulting tax burden is lower than that which would have resulted from
application of member states’ normal taxation method.23
2.

Participation of a Member State

Article 107(1) of TFEU and the European Commission, in its 1998
notice on business taxation (the “1998 Commission Report”), states that
an “advantage must be granted by the State or through State resources.”24
The 1998 Commission Report further states:
A loss of tax revenue is equivalent to consumption of State
resources in the form of fiscal expenditure. This criterion
also applies to aid granted by regional or local bodies in the
Member States. Furthermore, State support may be
provided through tax provisions which have legislative,
regulatory or administrative form and through the practices
of the tax authorities.25

23

2004 Commission Report, supra note 20.
EUR-LEX, supra note 13.
25
1998 Commission Report, supra note 22, at 4.
24
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3.

Aid’s Effect on Competition and Trade Between
Member States

Another condition prescribed by the TFEU states that an aid
“distorts or threatens to distort competition,”26 so, this criteria also applies
to a particular tax measure in order to classify it under Article 107(1) of
TFEU. The 1998 Commission Report clarifies this by stating that measure
must affect competition and trade between Member States. This criterion
requires that the beneficiary of the measure exercises an economic activity
involving trade between member states, regardless of the beneficiary’s
legal status or means of financing. The mere strengthening of the
beneficiary’s position compared with that of other firms that are its
competitors in internal market is enough to conclude that internal market
is affected. The small amount of aid, the beneficiary’s size or its small
share of internal market do not lead to a different conclusion.27 Non-profit
organizations and public enterprises may also be caught by Article 107(1)
of TFEU under certain conditions.28

26

EUR-LEX, supra note 13.
Id.
28
Kronthaler & Tzubery, supra note 6, at 108.
27

53
http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol1/iss1/5

14

Krmek: EU Tax Probe

4.

A Selective Advantage to an Undertaking

The last factor that needs to be satisfied, according to Article
107(1) of TFEU, is the selectivity of the measure in question. Article
107(1) describes the consequence of an aid as “favouring certain
undertakings or the production of certain goods.”29 As noted in the 1998
Commission Report:
The selective advantage involved here may derive from an
exception to the tax provisions of a legislative, regulatory
or administrative nature or from a discretionary practice on
the part of the tax authorities. However, the selective nature
of a measure may be justified by ‘the nature or general
scheme of the system’. If so, the measure is not considered
to be aid within the meaning of Article 92(1) of the
Treaty.30,31
A tax measure that is limited to certain taxpayers or to certain
categories of taxpayers based on common features and that deviates from
a member state`s “benchmark” tax system is considered to be selective.32
In summary, a tax measure constitutes a state aid if it puts a taxpayer in

29

EU-LEX, supra note 13.
1998 Commission Report, supra note 22, at 4.
31
Article 92(1) is today’s Article 107(1) of TFEU.
32
Kronthaler & Tzubery, supra note 6, at 109.
30
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more favorable situation as compared to other taxpayers in comparable
factual and legal circumstances.33
A performance of selectivity test34 is helpful in determining
whether a specific tax measure is selective. The test is consisted of three
steps:
1. Determination of a member state`s “common” or “normal” tax
system;
2. Determination whether a specific tax measure deviates from
the “normal” tax system by granting an advantage to the
beneficiary (taxpayer), as compared to a taxpayer in similar
factual and legal circumstances;
3. Justification of the measure by the nature and general scheme
of the tax system.
If the measure involved passes all three steps, i.e. if the measure
can be justified and is consistent with the principle of proportionality
(does not go beyond what is necessary for the fulfilment of its objective),
it does not fall into the scope of Article 107(1) of TFEU and it is not
considered a state aid.
The Court of Justice has confirmed that if the method of taxation
for intra-group transfers does not comply with the arm’s length principle,
and leads to a taxable base inferior to the one which would result from a
33
34

Id. at 105.
Id. at 110.
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correct implementation of that principle, it provides a selective advantage
to the company concerned.35
5.

De Minimis Exception

Commission Regulation (EU) Number 1407/2013 on the
application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union to de minimis aid prescribes a ceiling below which
Article 107(1) of TFEU can be considered not to apply. According to this
Regulation (which applies from January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2020)36
the total amount of de minimis aid granted per member state to a single
undertaking shall not exceed EUR 200,000 over any period of three fiscal
years.37 This rule ensures that any measure within the scope of this
Regulation can be deemed not to have any effect on trade between
member states and not to distort or threaten to distort competition. Such
measure is exempt from the notification requirement contained in Article
108(3) of TFEU.38

35

Luxembourg Alleged Aid to Amazon, supra note 12, at 14.
Commission Regulation 1407/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 352) 1, 8.
37
Id. at 5.
38
Id.
36
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6.

Procedural Aspect: Notification of State aid to and
Decision by the European Commission

The European Commission is the competent authority that decides
on compatibility of state aid with internal market, and the procedure is
prescribed by Article 108 of TFEU and Council Regulation (EC) Number
659/1999.39 Its decisions are subject to review by the Court of Justice. The
state aid control system distinguishes existing aid, introduced before the
establishment of the EU or a member state’s accession date, and new aid,
introduced after a member state’s accession date.40
The provision of Article 108(1) of TFEU for existing aid requires
“constant review all systems of aid existing” by the European Commission
and its proposals to the member states “any appropriate measures required
by the progressive development or by the functioning of the internal
market.”41 Existing aid is considered to be lawful as long as the European
Commission does not find it incompatible with the internal market.42
The provision of Article 108(3) of TFEU for new aid requires that
“the Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to
39

Commission Regulation 659/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 083) 1.
Kronthaler & Tzubery, supra note 6, at 120.
41
EUR-LEX, supra note 13.
42
Kronthaler & Tzubery, supra note 6, at 121.
40
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submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid.” 43 After a member
state has notified the European Commission, Article 108(3) of TFEU
obliges the state not to put its proposed measures into effect until this
procedure has resulted in a final decision by the European Commission.
This means that the European Commission has to determine a measure to
be compatible with the internal market before a member state puts the
measure into application. This procedure applies to all aid, including tax
aid.44
Even if a measure is covered by one of the ex lege exceptions
contained in Article 107(2) of TFEU, the member states still have an
obligation to notify the European Commission before they implement the
measure.
If a member state does not follow the European Commission`s
proposed measures, in case of existing aid, or the Commission concludes
that notified new measure represents a state aid, it will initiate a formal
investigation procedure in accordance with Article 108(2) of TFEU and
communicate its decision to a member state in question by letter, please

43
44

EUR-LEX, supra note 13.
1998 Commission Report, supra note 22, at 8.

58
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see below for review of the letter to Amazon. This procedure ends with a
final decision by which the European Commission decides on
(in)compatibility of the measure with internal market or its conditional
compatibility.45
III. EUROPEAN EFFORTS IN TACKLING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES
The suggestions within the EU on how to combat harmful tax
measures go back to the early 1990s. The Ruding Report presented to the
European Commission in 1992 was the “study of ways of reforming the
taxation of Community companies in an increasingly unified internal
market” and it set out a “series of practical recommendations” upon which
the Commission was to “draw up its own guidelines for company taxation
policy.”46 This Report concluded that:
Despite the tax convergence which has occurred over the
past decade, the Committee considers it unlikely that
Member States acting independently of each other can
bring about any significant reduction in the distortions
affecting the functioning of the internal market. Action
must therefore be taken at Community level.47

45

Kronthaler & Tzubery, supra note 6, at 124.
Press Release, European Commission, (Dec. 20, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_IP-92-197_en.htm.
47
Id.
46
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Further work included adoption of the Code of Conduct for
Business Taxation by the Council of Economics and Finance Ministers
(“ECOFIN”) of December 1, 1997. By adopting this Code, the member
states have obliged themselves to refrain from introducing any new
harmful tax measures (“standstill”) and amend any laws or practices that
are deemed to be harmful in respect of the principles of the Code
(“rollback”). The code covers tax measures (legislative, regulatory and
administrative), which have, or may have, a significant impact on the
location of business in the Union.48
Later in 1998, the European Commission published its “Notice on
Business Taxation of 1998,”49 which deals with the prohibition of state aid
in detail, and it was followed by the Report on the Commission Notice in
2004.
As noted in the introduction to this paper, the European
Commission has today been using the principles on prohibition of state aid
to tackle harmful tax competition and has lately initiated significant
48

European Commission, TAX’N & CUSTOMS UNION, Harmful Tax Competition (Jan. 20,
2017),
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/harmful_tax_practices/index
_en.htm.
49
1998 Commission Report, supra note 22.
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procedures “to examine whether decisions by tax authorities in Ireland, the
Netherlands and Luxembourg with regard to the corporate income tax to
be paid by Apple, Starbucks and Fiat Finance and Trade, respectively,
comply with the EU rules on state aid.”50
Specifically, the European Commission will examine if the three
transfer pricing arrangements, validated in the following tax rulings,
involve state aid to the benefit of the beneficiary companies:






The individual rulings issued by the Irish tax
authorities on the calculation of the taxable profit
allocated to the Irish branches of Apple Sales
International and of Apple Operations Europe;
The individual ruling issued by the Dutch tax
authorities on the calculation of the taxable basis in
the Netherlands for manufacturing activities of
Starbucks Manufacturing EMEA BV;
The individual ruling issued by the Luxembourg tax
authorities on the calculation of the taxable basis in
Luxembourg for the financing activities of Fiat
Finance and Trade.51

Additionally, an investigation has been opened with regard to
corporate taxation of Amazon in Luxembourg, and this will be further
presented in this paper.

50
51

European Commission, supra note 2.
Id.
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The details of these cases can be found under case numbers:
SA.38373 (Alleged aid to Apple), SA.38374 (Alleged aid to Starbucks),
SA.38375 (Alleged aid to FFT), and SA.38944 (Alleged aid to Amazon) at
the website of the State aid register.52 The register contains, among other
things, information on a member state concerned, aid instrument in
question, case type, press release, and a letter from the European
Commission to the member state. The Commission has stated that Fiat and
Starbucks have received selective tax advantages from Luxembourg and
the Netherlands, respectively, which are considered illegal under EU state
aid provisions and has ordered those member states to recover due taxes
from both multinationals.
The proposal by the European Commission from March 2015
concerns amendment of the Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory
automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation. This proposal
has so far been identified as one of the strongest towards tax transparency
because its goal is to ensure “comprehensive and effective administrative
co-operation between tax administrations by providing for the mandatory

52

European Commission, State aid Register,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/ (last visited June 19, 2017).
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automatic exchange of information regarding advance cross border rulings
and advance pricing arrangements.”53 The core of the proposal is the new
provision of Article 8(a) which sets conditions for automatic exchange of
information on tax rulings issued or amended by competent authority of a
member state with other member states’ competent authorities. The
obligation also “catches” valid rulings issued in the ten-year period before
the date on which the proposed Directive will take effect. 54 According to
the proposal, the exchanged information should be stored in the central
depository.
IV. IS THE PRACTICE OF MULTINATIONALS COMPATIBLE WITH
INTERNAL MARKET – ALLEGED AID TO AMAZON
In its press release published on October 7, 2014, the European
Commission announced that it “opened an in-depth investigation to
examine whether the decision by Luxembourg's tax authorities with regard
to the corporate income tax to be paid by Amazon in Luxembourg comply

53

European Commission, supra note 2, at 3.
Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive 2011/16/EU as Regards
Mandatory Automatic Exchange of Information in the Field of Taxation, 12 COM (2016)
25 final (Jan. 28, 2016).
54
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with the EU rules on state aid.”55 This procedure was performed according
to Article 108(2) of TFEU.
As stated in the letter communicated by the European Commission
to Luxembourg (the “Letter”), “the Commission requested Luxembourg to
provide a complete description of the structure of Amazon in
Luxembourg, to provide for each of its activities in Luxembourg the
amount of tax due for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013, and to provide an
explanation on how those amounts were determined.”56 The Commission
also requested all tax rulings addressed to the Amazon Group in
Luxembourg since 2004 together with transfer pricing report, if any,
provided by Amazon to the Luxembourg authorities.
In its reply to the Commission`s request, the Luxembourg
authorities provided a tax ruling addressed to Amazon dated November 6,
2003.57 The exact matter of concern of the European Commission is
described in paragraph 7 of the Letter as:

55

Press Release, European Commission, State Aid: Commission Investigates Transfer
Pricing Arrangements on Corporate Taxation of Amazon in Luxembourg (Oct. 7, 2014).
56
Luxembourg Alleged Aid to Amazon, supra note 12, at 1-2.
57
Id. at 2.
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A tax ruling which validates a transfer pricing
arrangement58, also referred to as advance pricing
arrangement (“APA”). APA means an arrangement that
determines, in advance of intra-group transactions, an
appropriate set of criteria (e.g. method, comparables,
critical assumptions as to future events) for the
determination of the transfer pricing for those transactions
over a fixed period of time.59
Describing a multinational company doing business in many
different jurisdictions where different tax rates apply, the European
Commission made the following observation:
The after tax profit recorded at the corporate group level is
the sum of the after-tax profits in each country in which it
is subject to taxation. Therefore, rather than maximise [sic]
the profit declared in each country, multinational
corporations have a financial incentive when allocating
profit to the different companies of the corporate group to
allocate as much profit as possible to low tax jurisdictions
and as little profit as possible to high tax jurisdictions.60
The European Commission gives an example that:
This could be achieved by exaggerating the price of goods
sold by a subsidiary established in a low tax jurisdiction to
a subsidiary established in a high tax jurisdiction. In this
manner, the higher taxed subsidiary would declare higher
costs and therefore lower profits when compared to market
58

Id. at 2-3. As defined in par. 8 of the Letter, transfer pricing refers to the prices charged
for commercial transactions between various parts of the same corporate group, in
particular, prices set for goods sold or services provided by one subsidiary of a corporate
group to another subsidiary of that same group. Id.
59
Id. at 2.
60
Id. at 3.
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conditions. This excess profit would be recorded in the
lower tax jurisdiction and taxed at a lower rate than if the
transaction had been priced at market conditions.61
The question arises why is this observation so important? The
European Commission clarifies the tax consequences of such an
“artificial” price by stating:
If the (manipulated) price of the transaction between
companies of the same corporate group were taken into
account for the assessment of the taxable profits in each
jurisdiction, it would entail an advantage for the firms
which can artificially allocate profits between associate
companies in different jurisdictions compared to other
undertakings. So as to avoid this type of advantage, it is
necessary to ensure that taxable income is determined in
line with market conditions.62
What standards or methods are to be applied to associate entities so
that they abide by market conditions and do not artificially allocate
profits? Arm’s length principle is an international standard for setting
commercial conditions between companies of the same corporate group or
a branch and its parent company and for the allocation of profit. Arm’s
length standard requires that commercial and financial relations between

61
62

Id.
Id.
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associated enterprises should not differ from relations, which would be
made between independent companies.63
The Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and
Tax Administrations issued by OECD “provide guidance on the
application of the “arm's length principle” for the valuation, for tax
purposes, of cross-border transactions between associated enterprises.
They stress that it is very important to prevent multinationals in artificially
shifting their income, and to tax them where they exercise their economic
activities.”64
A “normal” calculation of taxable profit in the case of an
independent enterprise is based on the difference of its income and
expenses. Methods have been developed for determining taxable income
of associated enterprises for the purpose of preventing them in tax
avoidance and to achieve a comparable level of taxation, which could have
been arrived at if they were independent market players.65

63

Id.
OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax
Administrations (herein “OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines”), Abstract (2010),
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/transfer-pricing-guidelines.htm.
65
Luxembourg Alleged Aid to Amazon, supra note 12, at 3.
64
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OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines provide five methods for
determining that prices in transactions between affiliates are in compliance
with an arm’s length principle:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The comparable uncontrolled price method;
The cost plus method;
The resale minus method;
The transactional net margin method; and
The transactional profit split method.66
1.

The Amazon Group as Beneficiary of the tax Ruling

As stated in paragraph 16 of the Letter, the European Commission
focused its investigation on a tax ruling concluded on November 6, 2003
between the Luxembourg tax authorities and the Amazon group,
consisting of Amazon.com Inc. and its subsidiaries.67 Amazon is an online
retailer and its business also consists of the manufacture and sale of Kindle
devices. It offers programs that “enable sellers to sell their products on
Amazon websites and their own branded websites, and to fulfill orders
through Amazon. Besides that, Amazon generates revenue through other
marketing and promotional services, such as online advertising and co-

66
67

Id.
Id. at 5.

68
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

29

The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 1 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 5

branded credit card agreements. Amazon’s worldwide net sales in 2013
amount to $74,452,000 and a post-tax net profit was $274,000,000.”68
2.

Amazon’s Structure in Luxembourg

Paragraphs 18 – 23 of the Letter describe the structure of Amazon
group in Luxembourg. It is comprised of several entities:
1.

2.

3.
4.

Amazon EU Société à responsabilité limitée
(“Amazon EU Sarl”), having a function of the
“head office of Amazon for Europe and is the
principal operator of the retail and business services
offered through Amazon’s European websites. It
holds other European subsidiaries, owns the
inventory, earns the profits associated with the
selling of products to end customers, and bears the
risk of any loss.”69
Amazon Europe Technologies Holding SCS (“Lux
SCS”), being “a Luxembourg limited liability
partnership that holds all the shares in Amazon EU
Sarl, licenses the Amazon group’s intellectual
property rights to Amazon EU Sarl to operate the
European websites in return for a tax deductible
royalty payment.”70
Amazon Services Europe Sarl, being a “third party
seller (i.e. marketplace) business.”71
Amazon Media EU Sarl, being a “Amazon’s EU
digital business (in which MP3s and eBooks are
sold).”72

68

Id.
Id.
70
Id. at 5-6.
71
Id. at 6.
72
Id.
69
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The first, third, and fourth companies listed above form a fiscal
unity in Luxembourg together with entities Amazon Luxembourg Sarl,
FinLux Sarl and Amazon Payments SCA, with the first listed company
being the parent of the unity. These entities are liable for corporate income
tax in Luxembourg.73 There are other entities existing in Luxembourg,
which are subsidiaries of the second company listed above.
3.

Letters by Amazon of October 23 and 31, 2003 and
Response by Luxembourg of November 6, 2003

In letters from October 23 and 31, 2003, Amazon requested the
acceptance of the transfer pricing arrangement between Amazon EU Sarl

73

Id.
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and Lux SCS and the approval of the legal structure of Amazon for
Luxembourg corporate income tax purposes by the Luxembourg tax
authorities. Amazon`s requests were approved by the Luxembourg tax
authorities on November 6, 2003, just several days after the initial
request.74 The letters sent by Amazon described the restructuring plan for
its European business. Only a part of the plan is important for the purpose
of this paper, which, among others, describes that:





The headquarters is based in Luxembourg,
Amazon EU Sarl is the operator of the retail and business
services offered through Amazon’s European websites
(operator of European websites and owner of servers
through which transactions are processed),
Lux SCS (a limited liability partnership which holds all
shares in Amazon EU Sarl) is a transparent entity for tax
purposes in Luxembourg and its purpose is to be an
intangibles holding company which licenses IP to Amazon
EU Sarl in return for a tax deductible royalty payment.75

The confirmation by the Luxembourg tax authorities in their letter
of November 6, 2003 in which they accepted the transfer pricing
arrangement of Amazon is subject of review by the European Commission
in the context of alleged state aid.

74
75

Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 5, 7.
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4.

Transfer Pricing Agreement Between Amazon EU Sarl
and Lux SCS

According to the Letter, the IP was developed in the United States
and Lux SCS obtained a right to exploit it. Lux SCS licensed that IP to
Amazon EU Sarl in return for a tax-deductible royalty payment that was
approved by the Luxembourg tax authorities. It was agreed that the
amount of royalty is computed each year and it would be equal to a
percentage of Amazon EU Sarl`s revenue with regard to its operation of
the European web sites.76
Due to the fact that Lux SCS is a transparent entity77 for tax
purposes in Luxembourg, the royalties it receives from Amazon EU Sarl
are not taxed at the entity level in Luxembourg. Instead, this income is, or
should be, taxed at the level of participants in the entity, that is, at the level
of the partners in Lux SCS, in their country of residence in the United
States, to whom the profits of Lux SCS are allocated.78

76

Id. at 10-11.
Transparent means that an entity does not have a separate tax personality and does not
get taxed at the level of the entity. Instead, the income should pass through the entity and
be taxed at the level of participants in the entity. The participants in this case are the
partners.
78
Luxembourg Alleged Aid to Amazon, supra note 12, at 12.
77
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Although this income should be taxed at the partners` level in the
United States, it gets an indefinite deferral until its repatriation to the
United States. The reason for this lies in different classification of Lux
SCS between Luxembourg and the United States, transparent in the first
and non-transparent in the latter country, due to the U.S. check-the-box
rules.79
According to the European Commission statement contained in
paragraph 40 of the Letter, Amazon also requested a confirmation from
the Luxembourg tax authorities that the level of activities carried out in
Luxembourg by Lux SCS and its partners cannot be interpreted as
constituting a fixed place of business, i.e. a permanent establishment that
could trigger taxation.80
5.

Did Amazon Receive a Selective Advantage

As stated earlier in this article, one of the prerequisites that needs to be
fulfilled for determination of state aid according to Article 107(1) of
TFEU is the selectivity of the measure in question. Only such tax measure
that puts a taxpayer in a more favorable situation compared to other

79
80

Id. at 8.
Id. at 12.
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taxpayers in comparable factual and legal circumstances constitutes a state
aid. This concern is expressed in paragraph 48 of the Letter and it is
manifested in possible lowering of Amazon’s tax liability in
Luxembourg.81 The European Commission elaborates in paragraph 48 to
52 why all other conditions for determination of state aid, as presented
earlier in this paper, are fulfilled.
The European Commission expressly stated, “it can also be
concluded that the ruling gives rise to a loss of State resources. That is
because any reduction of tax for Amazon results in a loss of tax revenue
that otherwise would have been available to Luxembourg.”82 For
determination of the selectivity criterion, the European Commission
proposed comparison of methods of assessment of the taxable income of
Amazon: the method approved in the tax ruling with the “ordinary” tax
method, “based on the difference between profits and losses of an
undertaking carrying out its activities under normal market conditions.”83
If Amazon`s calculation is in line with the market conditions, the
European Commission expects that an arrangement applied to Amazon
81

Id. at 13.
Id.
83
Id. at 14.
82

74
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

35

The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 1 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 5

would not differ from the arrangement “that a prudent independent
operator acting under normal market conditions would have accepted.”84
On the other side, if the reality shows that Amazon`s taxable base
is lower because the arm`s length principle was not correctly applied, it
results in a selective advantage for an entity, i.e. it is the case of prohibited
state aid.85 The European Commission has not had its final word on the
subject matter and the decision is still expected.
6.

The Response of the Luxembourg Government

In its response to the letter communicated by the European
Commission to Luxembourg with regard to the alleged aid provided to
Amazon by way of a tax ruling, Luxembourg denied that the tax ruling in
question constitutes state aid.86
The explanation provided by the Luxembourg Government in
support of its claim was that its tax code of 1967 does not give any
discretion to tax authorities and “consequently not able to give rise to State
aid unless the law was misapplied, which could, however, be judged solely

84

Id.
Id.
86
Id. at 12.
85

75
http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol1/iss1/5

36

Krmek: EU Tax Probe

by an assessment of the national law.”87 The Government added that this
particular ruling is “in line with the general tax ruling practice of
multinationals in Luxembourg and with the OECD principles.”88
Further, in paragraphs 43 and 44 of the Letter, the Government
stated that an arm’s length royalty was determined based on performed
analysis of agreements between Amazon and non-related third parties
which concern substantially the same IP, and the explanation is given why
the profit split method was applied to analyze the functions and risks of
Amazon EU Sarl and Lux SCS.89
7.

Provisions of Luxembourg tax law that Were the Basis
for the Amazon Ruling

Apparently, there was no official legislation in Luxembourg based
on which Amazon and tax rulings that concern other companies were
issued. Rather, it was a mere administrative practice to issue such rulings.
In December 2014, the Luxembourg parliament introduced amendments to
its national tax law, among which was a new provision that concerns the

87

Id.
Id.
89
Id. at 12-13.
88
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tax ruling practice, with its date of coming into force on January 1, 2015.90
This means that the current advanced ruling practice, which was based on
internal instruction issued in 1989 by the head of Luxembourg tax
authorities, gets modernized with its official basis in the national law.91
The new law also prescribed a time period of five years for the validity of
the decision.92
8.

Amendments to the Luxembourg law with Regard to tax
Rulings

This subchapter presents the French wording of the newly
introduced Paragraph 29a of the General Tax Act of Luxembourg, which
concerns issuance of tax rulings. This provision codifies the existing
practice of issuance of advance tax rulings. A provisional English
translation can be found parallel to the original French text.93

90

Luxembourg Introduces Legal Framework for Tax Rulings and Updates Transfer
Pricing Rules, ERNST & YOUNG (Dec. 29, 2014),
http://www.ey.com/gl/en/services/tax/international-tax/alert--luxembourg-introduceslegal-framework-for-tax-rulings-and-updates-transfer-pricing-rules.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Newsletter Du 27 Octobre 2014, LE GOUVERNEMENT DU GRAND-DUCHÉ DE
LUXEMBOURG (Oct. 27, 2014),
http://www.impotsdirects.public.lu/fr/archive/newsletter/2014/nl_27102014.html; Id.
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Chapitre 4 - Modification de la loi
générale des impôts modifiée du 22
mai 1931 («Abgabenordnung»)
Art. 8. La loi générale des impôts
modifiée du 22 mai 1931
(«Abgabenordnung») est modifiée
et complétée comme suit:
1° Il est inséré un paragraphe 29a,
libellé comme suit:
«(1) Sur demande écrite et motivée,
le préposé du bureau d’imposition
émet une décision anticipée relative
à l’application de la loi fiscale à
une ou plusieurs opérations
précises
envisagées
par
le
contribuable ayant pour effet de lier
le bureau d’imposition à l’occasion
de
l’imposition
à
effectuer
ultérieurement.
(2) La décision anticipée permet
d’offrir au contribuable par
l’interprétation
uniforme
et
égalitaire de la loi fiscale une
sécurité juridique par rapport au
traitement fiscal d’une ou de
plusieurs opérations projetées.
(3) Un règlement grand-ducal
détermine la procédure applicable
aux décisions anticipées.”
2° Le paragraphe 171 est complété
par un alinéa 3, libellé comme suit:
«(3) Les dispositions des alinéas 1
et 2 s’appliquent de manière
correspondante aux transactions
entre entreprises associées.»

Chapter 4 - Amendment to the
general tax law modified on May
22, 1931 ("Abgabenordnung")
Art. 8 The general tax law modified
on
May
22,
1931
("Abgabenordnung") is amended
and completed as follows:
1. A paragraph 29a is inserted, to
read as follows:
"(1)
Upon
written
and
motivated request, the tax inspector
of the tax office in charge issues a
binding advanced tax agreement
related to the application of the tax
law in one or more specific
transactions contemplated by the
taxpayer.

(2) Through a uniform and fair
interpretation of tax law, the
advance tax agreement offers legal
certainty to the taxpayer with
respect to the taxable treatment of
one
or
more
contemplated
transactions.
(3) A Grand-Ducal Regulation sets
forth the procedure for advanced
tax agreement.”
2. Paragraph 171 is completed by a
paragraph 3, to read as follows:
"(3) The provisions of paragraphs 1
and 2 shall apply correspondingly
to transactions between associated
enterprises."
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V. IS IT REALLY A SELECTIVE TAX TREATMENT?
The European Commission is currently investigating whether the
tax ruling provided to Amazon by Luxembourg tax authorities is in
compliance with the arm`s length principle. Its concerns are with regard to
the following:
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Failure of Luxembourg to submit a transfer pricing report
(analysis) prepared by Amazon in support of the transfer
pricing arrangement in the ruling request, although it seems
that such document might exist;94
Assessment of the Amazon`s ruling request within (only)
eleven working days from the receipt of the first letter
(which is a very short period of time had a transfer pricing
report been submitted and assessed);95
Appropriateness of transfer pricing method proposed by
Amazon which does not seem to correspond to any of the
OECD methods;96
Presentation of royalty payments by Amazon EU Sarl to
Lux SCS in the form of a royalty rate over revenue and not
really calculated in that way, but instead it is calculated as a
residual profit. Rather than being expressed as a percentage
of revenues, the royalty should be calculated based on
revenues;97
Deviation from the OECD transfer pricing and no
justification for the use of indirect method for an arm’s

94

Luxemourg Alleged Aid to Amazon, supra note 12, at 16.
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 17.
95
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6.

length remuneration due to Amazon EU Sarl, while there
was a possibility to use a direct method, which is also
preferred by the European Commission. In addition, the
level of remuneration seems low;98 and
The tax ruling is more than 10 years old, and has been
applied to Amazon without amendment, which would take
into account economic changes that occur over time.99

After taking all these concerns into account, the Commission
believed that the Amazon ruling is contrary to the arm’s length principle
and that the Luxembourg tax authorities provide an on-going selective
advantage to Amazon by agreeing on its tax liability. 100 The Commission
believed that all conditions for determination of state aid are fulfilled
which is considered contrary to the EU law and might be found
incompatible with the internal market.
VI. CONSEQUENCES OF ILLEGAL AID
The European Commission has broad powers in preserving the
European internal market. Its actions in dealing with illegal aid depend on
whether the aid already exists or represents a newly granted aid. If the
European Commission finds an existing aid to be incompatible with

98

Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 20.
100
Id.
99
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internal market, it can propose appropriate measures to the member state
concerned with a view to removing the distortion of competition caused
by the aid. However, it may not require such aid to be recovered from the
participants.101
The recovery of the new aid can be requested if measure that
constitutes it is implemented before receiving prior authorization from the
European Commission. Such aid is unlawful aid and it will have to be
recovered if it is determined to be incompatible with internal market.102
Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 provides that all
unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient of such aid.
The Notice on business taxation of 1998 explains the calculation of
the amount to be recovered in case of state aid in form of tax measures:
comparison is made between the tax actually paid and the amount which
should have been paid if the generally applicable rule had been applied,
and that amount is increased for the interest.103

101

1998 Commission Report, supra note 22, at 3-9.
Id. at 8.
103
Id.
102
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VII. INVESTIGATIONS IN THE U.S. AND HOW SHOULD THE U.S. ATTACK
ABUSIVE TAX PRACTICES
The European Union is not the only jurisdiction where the relevant
authorities “fight” multinational entities that shift their profits to those
member states where tax rates are lower, such as Luxembourg or Ireland,
with the goal of cutting their tax bills. Amazon’s transfer pricing dispute104
(to name just one example) with the tax authorities in the United States
(Internal Revenue Service) before the U.S. Tax Court shows that tax
avoidance is a global phenomenon, which goes beyond the borders of the
European Union.
Joint Committee on Taxation, a body of the United States
Congress, prepared a publication, “Present Law And Background Related
To Possible Income Shifting And Transfer Pricing,” which it submitted to
the House Committee On Ways And Means on July 22, 2010. In this
document, the Joint Committee on Taxation presented six cases (described
on an anonymous basis) of U.S. based multinational corporations that had
an effective (i.e. average) tax rate on worldwide income of less than 25%

104

Amazon.Com, Inc. & Subsidiaries V. Comm’r Of Internal Revenue, Docket No.
031197-12 (T.C. 2014),
https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/USTCDockInq/DocketDisplay.aspx?DocketNo=12031197.
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during at least one multi-year period since 1999.105 The goal of the case
study was to “identify business structures that facilitate possible income
shifting or deficiencies in the application of transfer-pricing rules.”106 This
publication states, in the overview of the U.S. tax system, that:
The United States employs a worldwide tax system under
which U.S. resident individuals and domestic corporations
generally are taxed on all income, whether derived in the
United States or abroad; the foreign tax credit provides
relief from double taxation. Income earned in the United
States directly or through a pass-through entity (such as a
branch) is taxed on a current basis. By contrast, active
foreign business earnings that a U.S. person derives
indirectly through a foreign corporation generally are not
subject to U.S. tax until such earnings are repatriated to the
United States through a distribution of those earnings to the
U.S. person.107
The publication further notes that the principal tax policy concern
is that “profits may be artificially inflated in low-tax countries and
depressed in high-tax countries through aggressive transfer pricing that
does not reflect an arm’s length result from a related-party transaction and

105

Testimony of Staff of the J. Comm. on Tax’n Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means
Hearing on Transfer Pricing Issues 1 (2010).
106
J. Comm.on Tax’n, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATED TO POSSIBLE INCOME
SHIFTING AND TRANSFER PRICING 1 (Comm. Print 2010).
107
Id. at 5.
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that there is “empirical evidence that U.S. multinational corporations shift
income to low-tax foreign jurisdictions.”108
Examples of corporations such as Amazon and others that are
“rich” with intellectual property (“IP”) show that a reduction in the U.S.
tax base is accomplished by moving the IP rights into a low tax
jurisdiction. The above quoted publication describes two possibilities for
accomplishing this goal: either by having a “foreign affiliate enter into an
agreement with the U.S. group to buy in to the pre-existing foreign or
worldwide territorial rights to exploit the intellectual property rights
attributable to certain product lines and share the cost of future
development of those intellectual property rights” or by having the
“foreign affiliate enter into a license agreement with the U.S. group to
make and sell certain product lines either solely in non-U.S. territories or
worldwide.”109
The publication concludes that all companies presented in the case
study have the following common characteristics:


108
109

Concentration of more profitable functions in foreign
jurisdictions where the average tax rate is lower and a

Id. at 4, 5.
Id. at 10.
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concentration of their less profitable functions in
jurisdictions where the average tax rate is higher;
Exploitation of intangible property rights effectively as part
of foreign operations (as stated above, either through buyin and cost-sharing arrangements, or through licensing
agreements);
Deferral of a substantial percentage of foreign earnings by
effectively managing exposure to the subpart F rules
(check-the-box rules110 in conjunction with the
manufacturing exception111).112

According to the case study, these companies are successful in
concentrating their income in jurisdictions with low tax rates, statutorily
prescribed or negotiated with local authorities, in lowering their
worldwide tax rates and increasing their after-tax earnings.113
Various solutions have been suggested in the United States to
better tax worldwide income of its multinationals. For example, the U.S.
President in the Fiscal Year 2016 and 2017 Budgets of the U.S.
110

CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON ET AL., TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS
MATERIALS, TEXT AND PROBLEMS 1082 (4th ed. 2011). “Check-the-box regulations
permit the organization to elect to be treated for U.S. tax purposes either as a corporation
or as a conduit, flow-through or fiscally transparent entity (i.e. in effect, as a partnership
or if it has only one member, as a disregarded entity or branch). The election is available
to any business entity organized under foreign law except the foreign law counterpart of a
U.S. corporation, which is required, even under the check-the-box regulations, to be
treated as a corporation for U.S. tax purposes.” Id.
111
Id. at 911.“If a controlled foreign corporation manufactures goods in its country of
incorporation, the income it generates by their sale cannot be foreign base company sales
income.” Id.
112
J. Comm. on Tax’n, supra note 106, at 103-04.
113
Id. at 105.
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Government proposed a reform of the U.S. international tax system, which
would include the following:
1.

2.

3.

4.
5.
6.

Introducing a 19% minimum tax on foreign
earnings that would require U.S. companies to pay
tax on all of their foreign earnings when earned
(without opportunities for deferral), after which
earnings could be reinvested in the United States
without additional tax;
Preventing U.S. companies from avoiding tax
through “inversions” (transactions in which U.S.
companies buy smaller foreign companies, then
reorganize the combined firm to reduce U.S. tax
liability);
Preventing foreign companies operating in the U.S.
from using excessive interest deductions to “strip”
earnings out of the U.S. and avoid U.S. tax;114
Limiting shifting of income through intangible
property transfers;
Restricting the use of hybrid arrangements that
create stateless income; and
Limiting the ability of domestic entities to
expatriate.115

Proposals from prior budgets included:
1. Taxing excess returns on intangibles: treating excess
returns in a low tax country on intangibles
transferred to it from the United States as Subpart F
income (current taxation) and in a separate foreign
tax credit basket (to prevent other foreign taxes to
offset U.S. taxes due on the excess returns);
114

OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT,
57 (2015).
115
Id. at 125-26.
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2. Clarifying rules that concern transfer pricing of
intangibles: intangibles would include workforce in
place, goodwill, and going concern value. IRS would
be able to aggregate intangibles if that leads to a
more appropriate value. The best value of intangibles
would be by a willing buyer and seller with
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.116
VIII. OECD: BEPS PROJECT AND THE STATELESS INCOME PROBLEM
The European Union and the United States participate in an
internationally coordinated and worldwide approach to tackle double nontaxation and the artificial shifting of profits, known as the BEPS Project.
The BEPS Project is developed under the leadership of OECD, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
BEPS stands for “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” and refers to
“tax planning strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to
make profits ‘disappear’ for tax purposes or to shift profits to locations
where there is little or no real activity but the taxes are low, resulting in
little or no overall corporate tax being paid.”117
OECD explains that BEPS is caused when “activities cross border,
the interaction of domestic tax systems means that an item of income can
116

Gravelle, supra note 1, at 46.
OECD, BEPS – Frequently Asked Questions, OECD.ORG,
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-frequentlyaskedquestions.htm (last visited June 19, 2017).
117
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be taxed by more than one jurisdiction, thus resulting in double taxation.
The interaction can also leave gaps, which result in income not being
taxed anywhere. BEPS strategies take advantage of these gaps between tax
systems in order to achieve double non-taxation.”118 Therefore, BEPS
does not necessarily deal with illegal tax avoidance strategies, but with
strategies that are legal within tax regimes implemented by governments
of different countries among which there are discrepancies in tax rules.
Those who use BEPS strategies use these differences to cut their tax bills.
The wider international community has been concerned about
BEPS because it provides certain taxpayers a “competitive advantage over
enterprises that operate at the domestic level”119 with the result of
distortion of competition. BEPS Project is a worldwide approach,
including not only the most developed countries in the world, but also
non-G20/non-OECD members that are also concerned about this issue and
are actively participating in the project. BEPS consists of 15 action

118
119

Id.
Id.
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plans120 that aim to bring profound amendments to the international tax
rules. These action plans are the following:
















Action 1 - The digital economy
Action 2 – Hybrid mismatch arrangements
Action 3 – Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) regimes
Action 4 – Financial payments
Action 5 – Harmful tax practices
Action 6 – Treaty abuse
Action 7 – Permanent establishment (PE) status
Action 8 – Transfer pricing and intangibles
Action 9 – Transfer pricing and risks/capital
Action 10 – Transfer pricing and other high-risk
transactions
Action 11 – Data and methodologies
Action 12 – Disclosure of aggressive tax planning
Action 13 – Transfer pricing documentation
Action 14 – Dispute resolution mechanisms
Action 15 – A multilateral instrument

The ultimate goal of this project is to enable countries to impose
taxation on income in those jurisdictions where multinationals exercise
economic activity and to prevent possibilities for allocating income to
places with no nexus to such activity, through harmonization of
international taxation rules. If this project achieves its desired goals, it
may mean an end to the artificial shifting of income and double non-

120

Id.
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taxation. In the end, it will result in restoring and strengthening taxing
rights of sovereign countries around the world.121
As these measures, which are mere recommendations by OECD,
will not become directly applicable for all participants in the BEPS
Project, OECD stated that they will have to be introduced through
domestic laws, bilateral tax treaties, or a multilateral convention that
would amend the network of existing bilateral tax treaties at one time.122
IX. COMMISSION’S JUNE 2015 ACTION PLAN FOR FAIR AND EFFICIENT
CORPORATE TAX SYSTEM – REINTRODUCING CCCTB
The European Commission presented its “Action Plan for Fair and
Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union” on June 17, 2015
(the “Action Plan”).123 The Action Plan represents a proposal for
fundamental reform of corporate taxation system within the EU that
currently provides opportunities for multinational companies to engage in
complex tax strategies with a goal of avoiding taxes. The Commission
believes that if the member states were to cooperate more closely and
together through the Action Plan they would develop “fair, efficient and
121

Id.
Id.
123
Communication from the Commission to The European Parliament and the Council
(herein “Action Plan”), COM (2015) 302 final (June 17, 2015).
122
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more growth-friendly”124 corporate tax environment. The Commission
proposes five elements125 for the major upgrade of corporate tax structure,
as follows:
1.
Re-launching the Common Consolidated Corporate
Tax Base (“CCCTB”), by introduction of one set of rules
for calculation of companies’ profits for all their activities
in the EU, in lieu of various national rules that currently
apply. The biggest advantage of this system would be a
consolidation that would allow “offsetting losses in one
member state against profits in another.”126 The CCCTB
would be mandatory for all member states. It is expected
that it would be “highly effective in tackling profit shifting
and corporate tax abuse”127 and result in (administratively)
simpler and cheaper environment for companies doing
business in the EU.
2.
Ensuring effective taxation where profits are
generated, by introduction of various measures that will
secure effective taxation in the EU of companies doing
business in the EU and measures for improving the transfer
pricing system. The Commission has plans for adjusting the
definition of permanent establishment, amending the
controlled foreign corporation (“CFC”) rules, and updating
the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, Interest and
Royalties Directive and Parent Subsidiary Directive.
Creating a better business environment, by
3.
removing tax obstacles for EU businesses and simplifying
and attracting businesses to operate in the EU. The
Commission has in mind introduction of the CCCTB and
124

Press Release, European Commission, Questions and Answers on the Action Plan for
Fair and Efficient Corporate Taxation in the EU (June 17, 2015),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5175_en.htm.
125
Id.
126
Action Plan, supra note 123.
127
Id.
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new mechanisms for resolving double tax disputes and
allowing cross-border loss offsetting. This would result in a
level playing field for all companies, from small start-ups
to multinationals.
4.
Increasing transparency, by publishing first pan-EU
128
list
of tax havens (“third-country non-cooperative
jurisdictions”) and opening an online public consultation129
on tax transparency and public disclosure of corporate tax
information by companies, which is a continuation of Tax
Transparency Package130 introduced in March 2015 that
proposed an automatic exchange of information on crossborder tax rulings.
5.
Improving EU coordination on corporate tax
matters, by introduction of joint audits that would allow tax
authorities of different member states to jointly audit a
multinational company.
A major difference between OECD’s BEPS project, which is
actively supported by the EU, and the Action Plan is the latter’s
mandatory nature. As stated earlier, BEPS represents a set of legally nonbinding recommendations, which needs to be implemented through
bilateral or multilateral tax treaties. On the other side, the European
128

Tax Good Governance in the World as Seen by EU Countries, EUROPEAN COMM’N
(2016), http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/tax-goodgovernance/tax-good-governance-world-seen-eu-countries_en (last visited June 19,
2017).
129
Public Consultation on Further Corporate tax Transparency, EUROPEAN COMM’N
(2015), http://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2015/further-corporate-taxtransparency/index_en.htm (last visited June 19, 2017).
130
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on
tax Transparency to Fight tax Evasion and Avoidance, EUROPEAN COMM’N (2015),
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52015DC0136 (last
visited June 19, 2017).
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Commission proposes mandatory, legally binding solutions for EU-28
through the Action Plan. The Commission expressly confirmed that it has
“no intention” to harmonize corporate tax rates because it is “Member
States’ sovereign right to decide their statutory tax rates.”131 Adoption of
these measures could deliver the necessary framework for fair and
efficient corporate taxation system in the EU, with clear and transparent
rules that would make it difficult or impossible for multinational
companies to engage in aggressive tax planning to artificially reduce their
tax debts and result in fair distribution of tax revenues among the member
states.

X. EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S PROPOSAL FOR ANTI-TAX AVOIDANCE
DIRECTIVE
In early 2016, the European Commission announced its anti-taxavoidance package that, among others, includes a draft anti-tax-avoidance
directive. The Commission explained the policy behind the package as
“competitive disadvantage suffered by businesses that do not engage in
aggressive tax planning” compared to those that do and “significant

131

EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 124.
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revenue loss” by the member states.132 The draft directive suggests
implementation of some BEPS-presented measures as minimum standards
to the EU member states to provide better protection to the corporate tax
bases. Some of the key suggestions133 of the draft directive are:






Introduction of the General Anti-Abuse Rule (“GAAR”) –
The tax authorities’ tool to disallow transactions with the
main purpose of obtaining a tax advantage that defeats the
purpose of the provision or rule.
Hybrid entities mismatch rules – These encompass rules
that deal with mismatches between EU member states as a
result of hybrid entities or instruments. Hybrid entities or
instruments provide tax advantages for multinational
groups resulting from differences in the tax treatment of an
entity or instrument between different jurisdictions.
Introduction of the controlled foreign corporation (“CFC”)
rules for entities subject to a low level of taxation and
where a certain percentage of the entities income is passive
(usually more than 50%).

Taking into account the complex enactment procedure, before the
European Parliament and the Council, it is predicted that the directive
might take effect in 2017.

132

PricewaterhouseCoopers, European Commission proposes anti-tax-avoidance
package, TAX INSIGHTS FROM INTERNATIONAL TAX SERVICES 3 (Feb. 3, 2016),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/tax-services/publications/insights/assets/pwc-europeancommission-proposes-anti-tax-avoidance-package.pdf.
133
Id. at 2.

94
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

55

The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 1 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 5

XI. CONCLUSION
The international community has become aware that sovereign
governments are losing millions of dollars and euros because of
multinational entities that shift their profits from jurisdictions with high
tax rates to low tax jurisdictions. There is no exact number on the total
loss that governments suffer each year, but some estimates suggest that it
amounts to more than $100 billion per year. The main reason for loss of
revenues are not illegal activities of multinationals known as tax evasion,
but tax avoidance which represent activities of multinational entities using
“loopholes” and discrepancies between tax regimes implemented by
different governments around the world. The right to taxation is the
prerogative of sovereign governments that do not succeed in exercising
that right in full because profits are moved away from jurisdictions in
which the economic activity occurs. It needs to be stressed that
multinational entities are led by their legitimate business reasons when
trying to lower their taxes. In doing so, they are using channels (i.e.
bilateral tax treaties) set up in legitimate procedures by sovereign
governments around the world.
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The procedures that undergo several phases of bilateral
negotiations between the governments, local parliamentary procedures that
include, usually, majority votes in parliaments and ratification processes.
Once bilateral treaties enter into force, they are to be used by businesses
that operate in cross-border environments. For people outside of the
business world it might be hard to understand that multinationals, while
wisely yet cautiously using legal gaps, are still fully complying with
bilateral tax treaties that have been negotiated and put into force by their
respective governments.
In addition, many countries have contributed to the problem by
their reluctance to the implementation of principles of transparency,
reporting of income and exchange of information, for the purpose of
keeping their bank secrecy and similar non-transparent rules in
application. In such an environment, the most common methods used by
multinationals for shifting their income from high to low tax jurisdictions
are transfers of intangibles (intellectual property), allocation of debt, and
using hybrid entities, to name just a few. One of the reports issued by the
U.S. Congress identified some major jurisdictions as tax havens, among
which are the Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, the UK, and three states
96
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in the United States, Delaware, Nevada, and Wyoming. Many other less
developed countries around the world have room to tighten their tax antiabuse rules as well.
In order to prevent further erosion of tax bases, OECD has invited
governments to act collectively, rather than on an individual basis. The
theoretical and political idea is that the tax laws need to be changed in a
way to achieve complete harmonization between tax regimes of different
countries. Various individual suggestions have been made from
introducing anti-abuse legislation or restricting foreign tax credits from
offsetting taxes owed to own country, but no proposal yet has been so
broad and thorough to amend international tax rules as the OECD’s
project on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”).
Although this project involves the most developed nations in the
world, as well as many developing countries not members of OECD, the
real question is whether such a complex international alliance can truly
combat harmful tax practices. In theory, the outcome of the BEPS project
should be a broad and harmonized implementation of standards that
prevent double taxation together with standards designed to avoid double
non-taxation. However, whether the current 96 members of the BEPS
97
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project can unanimously adopt its recommendations without any
reservations will eventually be an indicator of success.
Taking into consideration that there are a few thousand bilateral
tax treaties currently in effect which took years to negotiate and become
enforceable, and that BEPS Action 15 suggests a multilateral instrument to
implement tax-treaty BEPS related measures in all those treaties, the
author of this article does not believe in the broad success of the BEPS
project. It is not only the size of the project that is troubling, but also the
fact that some countries may only adopt those measures that fit them best.
For example, the European Commission is a long-standing supporter of
the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (“CCCTB”) project. This
project involves only EU member states and should enable companies that
operate in more than one EU member state to file a single tax return
through one tax administration for all their EU activities. In addition, it
would enable them to offset losses they have in one member state against
profits in another member state. Its positive effects would manifest in
greater transparency, simplification, reduction of compliance costs and
closing loopholes between member states’ tax systems. Although this
project has been developing for over a decade and it involves only 28
98
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countries (i.e. EU member states), unfortunately it has not achieved any
significant results yet.
The tax investigations performed by the European Commission
have shown that some multinational entities have paid too low corporate
income tax in particular EU member states. Specifically, the Commission
has stated that Fiat and Starbucks have received selective tax advantages
from Luxembourg and the Netherlands, respectively, which are considered
illegal under EU state aid provisions and has ordered those member states
to recover due taxes from both multinationals. The Commission suspects
that those companies have received illegal state aid by respective
governments implemented through issuance of advance tax rulings
providing legal certainty by “blessing” their corporate structures and
planned intra-group transactions. The Court of Justice will make the final
decision in both cases several years from now. In case the Court of Justice
confirms the Commission’s findings that the governments have not taken
into account regular market conditions and the arm’s length principle
when issuing advanced rulings, the consequences should include: the
repayment of aid received, increased for the amount of interests and
penalties, and public disclosure of financial information (as far as bank
99
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and tax secrecy rules allow). On the other side, if the Court of Justice does
not agree with Commission’s conclusions and rules in favor of
multinationals, there will already be some irreversible accompanying
consequences for such multinationals in terms of negative publicity and
damaged public image, potential loss of customers, and profit.
Amazon is still waiting for the outcome of the Commission’s
investigation. The European Commission preliminarily believes that the
tax ruling granted by Luxembourg resulted in a reduction of charges that
should have been borne by Amazon and, therefore, constitutes state aid. It
has not yet been decided whether that ruling is compatible with the EU
internal market or not. Although Luxembourg and the Netherlands have
been ordered to collect due taxes from Fiat and Starbucks respectively, the
decisions in those cases should not prejudice the outcome of the Amazon
investigation in the EU. Amazon has also been confronted with serious
and expensive procedure against the Internal Revenue Service before the
U.S. Tax Court, the outcome of which is still unpredicted; most part of the
trial has been closed to the public. Due to the fact that Amazon has been
involved in two major tax procedures (in the U.S. and in the EU), the
possible negative outcome of those procedures might be very burdensome
100
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for the company. It might result in reduced volume of business activity,
dismissal of employees, and company’s withdrawal from certain markets.
The case before the U.S. Tax Court might end in settlement with the IRS.
The European Commission’s decision will not be final for Amazon, since
it is subject to review by the Court of Justice that can either confirm the
Commission’s findings or rule in favor of Amazon.
The United States has put political pressure on the European
Commission stating that the EU is disproportionately targeting U.S.
companies and that “EU state aid probe violates the rule of law” by its
retroactive effect that is “improper and plainly undermines legal
certainty.”134 The United States has made it clear that it would “ensure that
the U.S. is using all of the tools at its disposal to protect U.S. interests.”135
One of the tools at the U.S.’ disposal is enforcing the Internal Revenue
Code Section 891 “Doubling of rates of tax on citizens and corporations of
certain foreign countries.”136 If Section 891 were invoked against the EU,

134

Kevin A. Bell & Alex M. Parker, Hatch, Wyden: EU State Aid Probe Violates Rule of
Law DAILY TAX REP. (May 23, 2016).
135
Id.
136
Internal Revenue Code Section 891 reads: “Whenever the President finds that, under
the laws of any foreign country, citizens or corporations of the United States are being
subjected to discriminatory or extraterritorial taxes, the President shall so proclaim and
the rates of tax imposed by sections 1, 3, 11, 801, 831, 852, 871, and 881 shall, for the
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it would “double the tax rate on income earned at U.S. subsidiaries of
European companies.”137 Specifically, enforcement of this section would
mean that a U.S. domestic 30% tax rate would apply on certain types of
income of EU corporations doubled by the application of Section 891. For
U.S. source could become taxable by 60% tax rate, where Croatia does not
have a double tax treaty with the United States that could provide a relief.
Such an economic warfare between the United States and the EU might
put pressure on the European Commission to end tax investigations
against U.S. multinationals.
Differences between corporate tax regimes influence choices of
multinational entities’ location and investments. Multinational businesses
that operate in cross-border environments have legitimate business reasons
taxable year during which such proclamation is made and for each taxable year thereafter,
be doubled in the case of each citizen and corporation of such foreign country; but the tax
at such doubled rate shall be considered as imposed by such sections as the case may be.
In no case shall this section operate to increase the taxes imposed by such sections
(computed without regard to this section) to an amount in excess of 80[%] of the taxable
income of the taxpayer (computed without regard to the deductions allowable under
section 151 and under part VIII of subchapter B). Whenever the President finds that the
laws of any foreign country with respect to which the President has made a proclamation
under the preceding provisions of this section have been modified so that discriminatory
and extraterritorial taxes applicable to citizens and corporations of the United States have
been removed, he shall so proclaim, and the provisions of this section providing for
doubled rates of tax shall not apply to any citizen or corporation of such foreign country
with respect to any taxable year beginning after such proclamation is made.” I.R.C. § 891
(2015).
137
Bell & Parker, supra note 134.
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to concentrate their activities where the cost of doing business is the
lowest. In doing so they are using bilateral tax treaties entered into
between their sovereign governments. Their activities can result in erosion
of tax bases and a loss of tax revenue for tax authorities. However, these
“harmful” tax practices, as they are commonly called in the press, have
been enabled by the governments, and not by the multinationals.
Multinationals should not be in the spotlight for using the means (i.e. tax
treaties) that were provided to them by their sovereign governments.
Governments have become aware of this phenomenon and are trying to
prevent further erosion of tax bases by harmonizing their tax regimes and
tightening anti-abuse rules through projects such as BEPS and CCCTB. It
is uncertain whether these projects will succeed because countries can
selectively adopt only those measures that suit them best which would
inevitably contribute to even more complexity in an already complex
world of international tax.
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